South Korea

Chosun Ilbo | English | News | Jan. 23, 2026 | Extreme Weather Events

On January 22, the cold wave in South Korea is expected to peak, marking the coldest day of the winter so far, with Seoul experiencing a morning temperature of minus 13 degrees Celsius and a perceived temperature of minus 19 degrees Celsius. The Korea Meteorological Administration attributes this to a cut-off low-pressure system—a mass of Arctic cold air at minus 35 degrees Celsius—moving southward. Morning temperatures are forecasted between minus 19 and minus 5 degrees Celsius, with daytime highs ranging from minus 7 to 2 degrees Celsius. Strong winds will cause perceived temperatures to be 5 to 10 degrees lower than actual measurements.

Since January, cold waves with temperatures below minus 10 degrees Celsius have become more frequent in Seoul. On the 21st, the city's lowest temperature reached minus 12.2 degrees Celsius, with a perceived temperature of minus 17.9 degrees Celsius. Seoul has had five days this month with temperatures below minus 10 degrees Celsius, and the forecast predicts at least four more such days by the end of January, totaling nine days—roughly one cold wave every three days. Nationwide impacts include frozen seawater observed at Dadaepo Beach in Busan.

Despite global warming leading to milder winters over the past five years, this January has seen an intensification of cold waves due to frequent cut-off low-pressure systems. The weakening jet stream, influenced by global warming, allows Arctic cold air to escape more often. Unlike typical winters dominated by Siberian high-pressure systems at around minus 15 degrees Celsius, this winter has seen more frequent exposure to colder air masses near minus 35 degrees Celsius. Additionally, an unusual persistent high-pressure system east of Korea since January 20 has sustained cold northwesterly winds, prolonging the cold wave. This high-pressure "wall" is expected to maintain the cold conditions for about six days until the weekend.

Joongang Ilbo | English | News | Jan. 23, 2026 | Geopolitical Conflict and Disputes

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young visited peace trail routes and designated education sites near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the two Koreas on January 21, 2026. The visit was escorted by the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC), which cited the tour as part of a designated DMZ education and orientation program. Fifteen sites have been designated for such programs to ensure safety and stability in the area.

During the visit, Minister Chung walked the established ROK Peace Trail routes located south of the DMZ's southern boundary, which extend from Ganghwa to Goseong near the inter-Korean border. The UNC, responsible for enforcing the armistice from the 1950-53 Korean War and overseeing DMZ activities, emphasized the importance of maintaining control and stability in the buffer zone between South and North Korea.

The article also references ongoing contention regarding control over DMZ access between South Korea and the U.S., with the UNC opposing South Korea's bill to take control of DMZ access, stressing the need to avoid politicizing the area.

38 North | English | AcademicThink | Jan. 23, 2026 | North Korea

The latest US National Security Strategy (NSS) marks a significant shift in Washington’s approach to the Korean Peninsula by excluding North Korean denuclearization as a central concern and redirecting deterrence responsibilities primarily onto allies, especially South Korea. This shift reflects a reprioritization in US strategy that reduces direct engagement and increases South Korea’s burden in managing North Korea, resulting in a more volatile and unpredictable security environment.

North Korea views this strategic retrenchment as an opportunity to strengthen its position by adopting a more confrontational stance toward South Korea, potentially codifying a hostile inter-Korean doctrine at its upcoming Ninth Party Congress. Its military provocations serve a dual purpose: challenging South Korea’s control over contested maritime and air defense zones in a calculated manner to avoid large-scale escalation, and provoking political divisions within South Korea related to responses and the credibility of US extended deterrence.

South Korea is responding to these provocations by significantly increasing its defense budget and investing in advanced military capabilities, signaling a shift toward greater self-reliance and reduced dependence on the US nuclear umbrella. Discussions on indigenous nuclear options and strategic assets have entered mainstream political debate, reflecting growing doubts about the reliability of US deterrence.

The absence of North Korea from the US NSS increases the risk of an accelerated arms race on the Peninsula, compounded by US global strategic actions that raise perceptions of unpredictability and willingness to use force. This dynamic incentivizes both Pyongyang and Seoul to engage in competitive military buildup and riskier postures, especially around sensitive zones like the Northern Limit Line and Korea Air Defense Identification Zone, with a heightened chance of destabilizing escalation.

Underlying this situation are flawed assumptions within US policy that ambiguity and burden-shifting will maintain stability. Without clear communication, senior-level coordination, and explicit crisis management policies—including well-defined red lines—burden-shifting encourages risk-taking by all parties. The evolving arms competition and alliance asymmetries on the Peninsula increase the likelihood of costly miscalculations and military adventurism unless strategic signaling and allied coordination improve significantly.